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시장지배적 사업자의 리베이트 제공행위에 관한 EU의 판례에 대한 분석

An Analysis of Cases Regarding Rebates by Market-Dominant Undertakings in EU Competition Law

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We can see the typical examples of traditional, structuralist and form-based approach to abuse control through analyzing cases regarding rebates by dominant undertakings in EU Competition Law. A recent discussion for modernization of EU Competition Law demands the fundamental improvement in enforcing abuse control. Therefore all the criticisms of abuse control apply to precedents related to rebates by dominant undertakings in the same way. However we would be able to draw some implications from analysis on rebate cases of EU courts in that it is an regulatory example of abuse control which Korean Competition Law also adopts. Firstly, standard of judgement focusing on trading partners rather than competitors and consumers of EU case law corresponds to the requirements of the Number 3 in Article 3-2Section 1 which prohibits the unreasonable hindrance to other undertakings. If rebates by dominant undertakings is prohibited as discriminatory or compulsory conduct, when the restraints of freedom to choose source of supply is prominent, the prohibition on hinderance to other undertakings of Number 3 would apply to. Secondly, it is necessary to notice the EU courts’judgment on how and to what extent the competition authority should prove the effect of rebates in question. Lastly, the unfairness in EU rebates cases implies that the demand that fairness should be accomplished in trade in which dominant undertakings participate is not irrelevant in abuse control. Simply speaking, rebates by dominant undertakings is regulated in EU Competition Law as hindrance which impairs customers’ capability or possibility of competition through the restraints of freedom of choice, or unfairness in trading conditions. Now we should think over which perspective and standard of judgement we will take in order to regulate rebates by market-dominant undertaking in the Korean Competition Law, reflecting the regulatory examples of US and EU courts.

Abstract

We can see the typical examples of traditional, structuralist and form-based approach to abuse control through analyzing cases regarding rebates by dominant undertakings in EU Competition Law. A recent discussion for modernization of EU Competition Law demands the fundamental improvement in enforcing abuse control. Therefore all the criticisms of abuse control apply to precedents related to rebates by dominant undertakings in the same way. However we would be able to draw some implications from analysis on rebate cases of EU courts in that it is an regulatory example of abuse control which Korean Competition Law also adopts. Firstly, standard of judgement focusing on trading partners rather than competitors and consumers of EU case law corresponds to the requirements of the Number 3 in Article 3-2Section 1 which prohibits the unreasonable hindrance to other undertakings. If rebates by dominant undertakings is prohibited as discriminatory or compulsory conduct, when the restraints of freedom to choose source of supply is prominent, the prohibition on hinderance to other undertakings of Number 3 would apply to. Secondly, it is necessary to notice the EU courts’judgment on how and to what extent the competition authority should prove the effect of rebates in question. Lastly, the unfairness in EU rebates cases implies that the demand that fairness should be accomplished in trade in which dominant undertakings participate is not irrelevant in abuse control. Simply speaking, rebates by dominant undertakings is regulated in EU Competition Law as hindrance which impairs customers’ capability or possibility of competition through the restraints of freedom of choice, or unfairness in trading conditions. Now we should think over which perspective and standard of judgement we will take in order to regulate rebates by market-dominant undertaking in the Korean Competition Law, reflecting the regulatory examples of US and EU courts.

참고문헌 (13)

  1. 김수련, "조건부 리베이트에 대한 미국 및 유럽판결의 비교 - British Airways 사건을중심으로", 경제법판례연구, 6 (2010)
  2. 장득수, "인텔의 시장지배적 지위남용행위에 대한 심결의 국제비교", 경제법판례연구, 7 (2011)
  3. 조혜신, "시장지배적 사업자의 리베이트 제공행위에 관한 미국의 판례에 대한 분석", 경쟁법연구, 25, pp.194~243 (2012), 한국경쟁법학회[DOI]
  4. 조혜신, "독점규제법상 방해남용에 관한 연구", 박사, 경제법, pp.2011
  5. Akman, Pinar, "The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law - Law and Economic Approaches" (2012), Hart Publishing
  6. The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, "Economides, Nicholas", New York University School of Law Law & Eonomics Research, ~, pp.Series Working Paper No. 08-02 (2008)
  7. Faella, Gianluca, "The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates", Paper delivered at the Third Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law & Economics (ISLE) (2007), Luigi Bocconi University
  8. Gyselen, Luc, "Rebates, Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?, In European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is Abuse of Dominant Position" (2006), Hart Publishing
  9. Kallaugher, John, "Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82", European Competition Law Review, 25(5), pp.263~285 (2004)
  10. Kamann, Hans-Georg, "The Granting of Rebates by Market Dominant Undertakings under Article 82 of the EC treaty", European Competition Law Review, 26(2), pp.83~89 (2005)
  11. Rousseva, Ekaterina, "Rethinking Exclusionary Abuses in EU Competition Law" (2010), Hart Publishing
  12. Sher, Brian, "Price Discounts and Michelin 2: What Goes Around, Comes Around", European Competition Law Review, 23(10), pp.482~489 (2002)
  13. Waelbroeck, D, "Michelin Ⅱ : A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?", Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 1, pp.149~ (2005)

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