표준필수특허 보유자의 금지청구권 행사와 시장지배적 지위 남용행위에 관한 EU 사례 분석
SEP-Based Injunction and the Abuse of a Dominant Position – EU Case Studies
0
조회
0
다운로드
4
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Seeking injunctions on the basis of a standard essential patents(SEPs) for which a commitment to license under FRAND conditions may constitute an abuse of dominance and have serious negative effects on competition. The SSO’s IPR’policies often require members to make FRAND commitment which is to license SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. The implementation of FRAND licensing policies, so widely adopted by SSOs operating in the ICT industry, seems to be at the root of all disputes. It is arguable that SSOs themselves should be doing more to refine and clarify their policies. The difficulties faced by some SSOs(especially ETSI - one of three standardization organizations recognized by the European Commission) in their recent attempts to discuss the use of injunctions with members, reveal that broad consensus is unlikely. The European Commission’s focus has shifted to the use of injunctions on the basis of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. The decisions of Motorola and Samsung cases clearly state that seeking an injunction against an unwilling licensee is objectively justified under Article 102 TFEU. All the specific circumstances of the case need to be take into account in order to establish whether the potential licensee is actually willing to enter into FRAND license. Motorola decision has the merit of having addressed anticompetitive concerns arising from the questionable application by German judges of the Orange Book case. However, in fact, it leaves unanswered the question of the compatibility of SEP based injunctions with Art. 102 TFEU in circumstances in which the alleged infringer does not make an offer like Apple’s second Orange book offer. On July, 2015, the ECJ issued a judgement that clarifies at which point the proprietor of a SEP violates TFEU by bringing an action for a prohibition injunction. The judgement provides important guidelines for the assessment of the duties of SEP holders and alleged infringers of their patents. The European Commission decisions in Motorola and Samsung and the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in the Huawei case provide useful guidance but have still several issues. In any future action, the Korea competition agency and court’s goals will be to protect the benefits of standard-setting while minimising any anti-competitive risks.
Abstract
Seeking injunctions on the basis of a standard essential patents(SEPs) for which a commitment to license under FRAND conditions may constitute an abuse of dominance and have serious negative effects on competition. The SSO’s IPR’policies often require members to make FRAND commitment which is to license SEPs on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. The implementation of FRAND licensing policies, so widely adopted by SSOs operating in the ICT industry, seems to be at the root of all disputes. It is arguable that SSOs themselves should be doing more to refine and clarify their policies. The difficulties faced by some SSOs(especially ETSI - one of three standardization organizations recognized by the European Commission) in their recent attempts to discuss the use of injunctions with members, reveal that broad consensus is unlikely. The European Commission’s focus has shifted to the use of injunctions on the basis of FRAND-encumbered SEPs. The decisions of Motorola and Samsung cases clearly state that seeking an injunction against an unwilling licensee is objectively justified under Article 102 TFEU. All the specific circumstances of the case need to be take into account in order to establish whether the potential licensee is actually willing to enter into FRAND license. Motorola decision has the merit of having addressed anticompetitive concerns arising from the questionable application by German judges of the Orange Book case. However, in fact, it leaves unanswered the question of the compatibility of SEP based injunctions with Art. 102 TFEU in circumstances in which the alleged infringer does not make an offer like Apple’s second Orange book offer. On July, 2015, the ECJ issued a judgement that clarifies at which point the proprietor of a SEP violates TFEU by bringing an action for a prohibition injunction. The judgement provides important guidelines for the assessment of the duties of SEP holders and alleged infringers of their patents. The European Commission decisions in Motorola and Samsung and the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in the Huawei case provide useful guidance but have still several issues. In any future action, the Korea competition agency and court’s goals will be to protect the benefits of standard-setting while minimising any anti-competitive risks.
참고문헌 (21)
- 강부미, "주요 표준화기구의 최근 IPR 정책 (F", RAND를 중심으로), 2015, pp.5, ~[DOI]
- 지식재산권의 부당한 행사에 대한 심사지침 개선방안 연구, "공정거래위원회", ~ (2014)
- 곽중환, "ETSI와 ITU의 특허정책 개정동향", SEP Inside, 5 (2014), 특허청․한국지식재산전략원
- 지식재산권 중심의 연구개발전략 도입 방안, "성열용", 산업연구원, ~, pp.Issue Paper 2012-300 (2012)
- 오승한, "FRAND 확약 특허권자의 자발적 실시자에 대한 금지청구권의 행사와 독점규제법 위반 책임", 경쟁법연구, 29, pp.217~278 (2014), 한국경쟁법학회
- 오승한, "특허기술의 표준 책정과 경쟁법 적용의 문제", 산업재산권, (23), pp.675~712 (2007), 한국지식재산학회
- 이문지, "표준특허의 기회주의적 행사와 미국 反트러스트법 및 연방거래위원회법 제5조 부활의 기미", 서강법학연구, 11(2), pp.205~230 (2009), 법학연구소
- 이호영, "표준필수특허 보유자의 FRAND 확약 위반행위에 대한 공정거래법의 집행에 관한 연구", 상사법연구, 31(4), pp.233~289 (2013), 한국상사법학회
- 이황, "FRAND 확약 위반과 특허위협(Hold-up)에대한 공정거래법상 규제의 기준", 저스티스, (129), pp.193~248 (2012), 한국법학원
- 홍대식, "기술표준 관련 특허권의 행사와 한국 공정거래법의 적용 - 지식재산권 심사지침에 대한 비판적 검토를 중심으로 -", 고려법학, (63), pp.185~242 (2011), 법학연구원
- Alumina, Joaquin, "Looking back at five years of competition enforcement in the EU", Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (2014)
- Angeli, Michela, "Willing to Define Willingness: The (Almost) Final Word on SEP-Based Injunctions In Light of Samsung and Motorola", Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 6(4) (2015)
- A Study of IPR Policies and Practices of a Representative Group of Standards Setting Organizations Worldwide, "Bekkers, Rudi", National Academies of Science, ~ (2012)
- Intellectual property and standard setting, "European Union", ~, pp.DAF (2014), COMP[DOI]
- Fraunhofer, Dialogic, "Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights(IPRs)", ~ (2011)
- Gutermuth, Axel, "Standard Essential Patents, Injunctions, and Abuse of Dominance: Europe’s Highest Court Sets Important Precedent", ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ~ (2015)
- Hovenkamp, Herbert, "IP and Antitrust", ~ (2013)
- Lemley, Mark A., "Probabilistic Patents", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2) (2005)
- European Commission, "Antitrust: Commission Sends, Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential Patents", ~ (2013)
- Sidak, J. Gregory, "The Meaning of FRAND, Part Ⅱ : Injunctions", Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 11(1) (2015)
