디지털 경제에서의 스타트업 인수에 대한 경쟁법적 이해

Abstract

The digital economy has dynamic characteristics. On the other hand, in the digital economy, due to the extreme economies of scale and strong network effects, there is a risk of a preoccupation effect by powerful business operators (players). Accordingly, a winner-take-all phenomenon may arise. Promising startups equipped with groundbreaking technology can bring new dynamism to a rigid market and become the seeds of competition that trigger disruptive innovation. Therefore, from the standpoint of competition, the emergence and the growth of startups is a positive phenomenon. Recently, however, in big tech’s core business areas, it is not easy to see startups successfully settling in the market. This is because, when promising startups appear on the market, giant market players try to imitate the startup’s business model, expel the startup from the market through various methods, or try to acquire the startup in the early stage. Based on past cases, the acquisition of startups by giant platform operators is not a one-time event but a business strategy frequently appearing in the digital ecosystem. In addition, giant platform operators actively acquire not only startups competing in the core business fields but also startups in adjacent fields or completely different fields. These startup acquisitions reflect the digital ecosystem’s characteristics that seek to increase access points with users. At the same time, startup acquisitions can be a high-level containment strategy to prevent potential competitors from entering the market. A so-called ‘killer acquisition’ is an acquisition that is made with the purpose of getting another player to stop an innovative project, taking over the business, removing a potential competitor from the market, and ultimately preempting future competition. Such ‘killer acquisition’ is a problem that cannot be left to the autonomy of the market system because it impairs the market’s diversity, dynamism, and innovation and, above all, poses a significant threat to competition. Given the characteristics of this digital ecosystem, it is necessary to seriously discuss which factors to consider in the competition authority’s review of business combinations and, in particular, the examination of anti-competitiveness in the acquisition of startups. The competition authority evaluated competition restrictions by applying relevant-market theories or categorizing business combinations as horizontal, vertical, or mixed combinations. These existing methods, however, do not appear suitable for reflecting the characteristics of the current digital ecosystem. Therefore, when examining a business combination, the competition authority should flexibly adjust the method of determining the relevant market or restricting competition. It is also necessary for the competition authority to find sophisticated ways to properly evaluate the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects that may occur when acquiring startups.