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한국전쟁 휴전회담 초기‘개성사건’과 군사분계선 협상

The Gaeseong Incident and the Negotiation of the Military Demarcation Line in the Early Truce Talks during the Korean War

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The hot issue in the Truce Talks, the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) insisting by the United Nations Command(UNC) side should be the 38th Parallel insisting by the Communist side and the actual contact line. But the factors of delaying Truce Talks are the issues about Gaeseong Incident and the Movement of Truce Village. During the reopening talks after movement of Truce Village to Gaeseong, the two sides were continuously confronted to secure the Gaeseong area. Finally, the UNC side gave up the Gaeseong area although securing the Gaeseong area after moving Truce Village to Pamunjeom. In the other hand the Communist side secured successfully which was the unveiling issues in the Truce Talks. The principle of continuing combat actions became the exposing issue bringing the worst casualties in the war with extending the talks. The UNC side wanted to do continuously combat actions until signing the Armistice Agreement even after establishing the MDL, the Communist side accepted the proposal withstanding the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)’s request which was the stopping combat actions, Even though the UNC side could not secure the Gaeseong area, the UNC side appealed and set the establishment of the MDL based on the current contact line. With agreement the principle of continuing combat actions, the UNC side gained the preferential clue which could execute the military pressure to the communist side after the above mentioned agreement. Although the Truce Talks began to stop the Korean War, the continuing combat actions for gaining a domain terrain features during the Truce Talks kept a few confrontations, At the beginning in the talks, the UNC side appealed and strongly insisted the principle, but the Communist side accepted finally the proposed issue. It is meaning that the Communist also have to share the responsibility of the results. In the process of the talks, the role and options of the Republic of Korea and the NKPA were very restricted.

Abstract

The hot issue in the Truce Talks, the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) insisting by the United Nations Command(UNC) side should be the 38th Parallel insisting by the Communist side and the actual contact line. But the factors of delaying Truce Talks are the issues about Gaeseong Incident and the Movement of Truce Village. During the reopening talks after movement of Truce Village to Gaeseong, the two sides were continuously confronted to secure the Gaeseong area. Finally, the UNC side gave up the Gaeseong area although securing the Gaeseong area after moving Truce Village to Pamunjeom. In the other hand the Communist side secured successfully which was the unveiling issues in the Truce Talks. The principle of continuing combat actions became the exposing issue bringing the worst casualties in the war with extending the talks. The UNC side wanted to do continuously combat actions until signing the Armistice Agreement even after establishing the MDL, the Communist side accepted the proposal withstanding the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA)’s request which was the stopping combat actions, Even though the UNC side could not secure the Gaeseong area, the UNC side appealed and set the establishment of the MDL based on the current contact line. With agreement the principle of continuing combat actions, the UNC side gained the preferential clue which could execute the military pressure to the communist side after the above mentioned agreement. Although the Truce Talks began to stop the Korean War, the continuing combat actions for gaining a domain terrain features during the Truce Talks kept a few confrontations, At the beginning in the talks, the UNC side appealed and strongly insisted the principle, but the Communist side accepted finally the proposed issue. It is meaning that the Communist also have to share the responsibility of the results. In the process of the talks, the role and options of the Republic of Korea and the NKPA were very restricted.

참고문헌 (17)

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