640년대 후반高句麗⋅唐전쟁에 대한 검토

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the Tang’s military operations and Goguryeo’s responses in the period of 647~648. In the literature so far, the Taizong’s new strategy at this period has been termed by ‘long-term strategy’ or ‘long-term attrition strategy’. However, by examining the term ‘attrition’, this paper consequently argues that it is an inadequate one to explain the Tang’s military strategy. Moreover, the scope of the term is further divided into the two stages by taking account of the full-scale operation scheduled in 648. The first stage is ‘the shaping operation through attrition’, while no specific term is necessary for the second stage for its conventional nature of the operation. Also, for the military operations encompassing the entire period of 647~648, this paper forwards the term of ‘conquest strategy after the shaping operation’ to describe its nature in entirety. The change in military strategy can be attributed to the Taizong's recognition of the changes in strategic environment after the failure in the Liadong campaign as well as difficulty of at-once-conquest operation against Goguryeo. In response, he changed his military strategy, by launching small-scaled operations in 647-648. Tang strengthened the functional power of the Command Area of Yingzhou for ‘the shaping operation’, and mobilized Kitan and Xi. Warships and vessels were built, and placed in Laizhou for naval operation. Given the maintenance process of Yingzhou and Laizhou, it can be deduced that Tang invested heavily in the ‘the shaping operation’. Taizong’s ‘the shaping operation’ targeted the north of the Amnok river by attacking, the mid-river of Shaozi, the river mouth the Liao, the Liadodong Peninsula, and the river mouth of the Amnok, in order. Yon Kaesomun responded by fortifying fortresses including the Great Wall of Goguryeo, and reorganizing the defense system. However, such Yon Kaesomun's response could not prove effective against the Tang's offensives, as it specifically targeted the neutralization of the fortress defense system of Goguryeo. Hence, although Goguryeo’s defence capability remained intact, she improvised her strategy by combining the engagement and traditional 'defense fortress and field evacuation' strategy rather than implementing consistent military one. Inconsistent defence strategy was caused by 'field evacuation's nature inadequate to Tang’s offence strategy. In other words, 'field evacuation' requires that the offence by the adversary must be known prior to launching the operation, allowing sufficient time for preparation. However, the Tang’s operations were largely a surprise, forcing Goguryeo to respond by improvising its defence strategy.