Women’s Bargaining Power and Educational Expenditures: Implications for Subsidy Policy
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This study tackles the question of whether the distribution of power in a family might affect the level of expenditure on each child’s education. We constructed a direct measure of the bargaining power of a wife and husband within a household. Our analysis showed that a household spends more money on children’s education when the wife has a larger voice. We also found that the marginal effects of a wife’s income lessened when the relative power of the wife and husband was controlled. Our analysis may imply the effect of a household’s income will be multiplicative if women’s control of household resources empowers women. However, if all that matters is the power itself, then giving money to women without changing their bargaining power will not work toward our expectations.
Abstract
This study tackles the question of whether the distribution of power in a family might affect the level of expenditure on each child’s education. We constructed a direct measure of the bargaining power of a wife and husband within a household. Our analysis showed that a household spends more money on children’s education when the wife has a larger voice. We also found that the marginal effects of a wife’s income lessened when the relative power of the wife and husband was controlled. Our analysis may imply the effect of a household’s income will be multiplicative if women’s control of household resources empowers women. However, if all that matters is the power itself, then giving money to women without changing their bargaining power will not work toward our expectations.
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