샹까라의 Avidyaa이론에 대한 라마누자의 비판

Abstract

Examination of other viewpoints is as necessary as exposition of one's own viewpoint. Rāmānuja(1017-1137), a leading theistic Vedāntin, is at his best not only in elucidating the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, but also in examining the views of others in general and Advaita philosophy in particular. Avidyā which is otherwise called māyā is the key concept through which Advaita works out its metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical discipline. The distinction between nirguṇa-Brahman and saguṇa-Brahman presupposes the concept of avidyā. Further, In the system of Advaita, just as the difference between Brahman and jīva is the work of avidyā, even so the pluralistic universe is a product of avidyā. In the same way, the subject-object epistemology involving the distinction of the knower, the known, and the resulting knowledge and the theory of vivarta in terms of which the problem of error is sought to be explained presuppose the concept of avidyā. The Advaita theory of avidya is not acceptable to Rāmānuja. Considering that the concept of avidya plays an important role in Advaita, it is necessary for Rāmānuja to examine this concept carefully and formulate his objections against it. This is in the mahāasiddhānta of the Śrī-bhāṣya, i.1.1. He raises seven major objections, what is called saptavidha-anupapatti, against the Advaita theory of avidyā. I propose to consider in this paper the meaning of saptavidha-anupapatti and the manner in which Ramanuja in his Śrī-bhāṣya criticizes the Advaita theory of Avidyā.