합리주의적 국가건설론과 한국적 함의
Rationalist Theories of State Building and Implications for the Korean Traditional State Building
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본고는 행위자 중심의 관점에서 연구된 합리주의적 국가건설론을 재구성한다. 그리고 이를 통해 한국 전통국가건설의 역사에서 우리가 주목해야 할 요소를 밝히고자 한다. 합리주의적 접근은 자신의 효용을 최적화하는 행위자의 상호작용이 특정 균형으로 이어지면서 사회제도가 발생한다는 핵심 가정에 의거하여 국가를 비롯한 사회제도를 설명한다. 최근 합리주의적 국가건설론은 국가건설에 영향을 미치는 변수로 다음의 요소들을 제시하고 있다. 갈등의 결정성, 행위자의 미래에 대한 기대수준, 사회행위자의 집단행동력, 국가재정의 원천, 사회경제구조, 국내 정치경쟁성의 정도, 세계화의 정도, 조정의 딜레마 등이다. 이러한 변수들이 조합되는 방식에 따라 국가의 제도적 특징이 달라진다. 기존 연구는 이 중 한두 가지 변수에 집중하여 보편적 이론화를 추구하여 상당한 이론적 기여를 했다. 본고는 이들 연구에서 밝혀진 변수들의 조합을 통해 한반도 전통국가건설의 특징을 잠정적인 수준에서 살펴본다.
Abstract
This study examines rationalist theories on state building. Through this examination, it is expected to point out factors and relationships that we should focus on for the analysis of the Korean traditional state building. Rationalist theories assume that a social institution is an equilibrium where the interactions of utility maximizing individuals reach. So far significant rationalist researches have proposed the following factors that affect state building: conflict decisiveness, discount rate, collective action ability, the nature of state finance, factor endowment, political competitiveness, coordination dilemma. The way how these factors interact each other characterizes state institutionalization. Previous researches emphasize one or two factors to produce a general theory of state building around the world. Instead of trying to build another general theory, this study proposes research hypotheses of the Korean state building in the traditional era by the combination and extension of rationalist theories.
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