제3자의 태도를 인용하는 메타표상 표지: 인식 양태 ‘-겠-’과 ‘-지’
Metarepresentation of Third-Party Attitude in Korean Epistemic Modality: ‘-gess- and ‘-ci’
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Korean epistemic markers ‘-gess-(-겠-)’ and ‘-ci(-지)’ do not express the speaker’s own conjecture or perception; rather, they mark a metarepresentation that presents the conjectures/perceptions of (generalized) others- that is, (virtual) third parties. Prior work—namely Theory of Mind (the capacity to attribute subjective states to others), epistemic modality as a metarepresentational marker that uses the proposition interpretively, and extended intersubjectivity (encoding the stance of generic or specific third parties)—jointly supports the claim that grammatical form can represent others’ modal evaluations. Because choosing to cite and present a third party’s stance instead of stating one’s own is a strategic move, this layer is closely tied to illocution. Since metarepresentation operates at a level above traditional epistemic modality, it does not conflict with established accounts of ‘-gess-’ and ‘-ci’ (e.g., [types of evidential basis], [already-knownness]), and it can also handle counterexamples. Moreover, this perspective explains why, depending on context, ‘-gess-’ and ‘-ci’ yield nuances such as [mitigation] and [commonsense/obviousness], and why they support illocutionary functions such as [empathy], [complaint], and [promise].
Abstract
Korean epistemic markers ‘-gess-(-겠-)’ and ‘-ci(-지)’ do not express the speaker’s own conjecture or perception; rather, they mark a metarepresentation that presents the conjectures/perceptions of (generalized) others- that is, (virtual) third parties. Prior work—namely Theory of Mind (the capacity to attribute subjective states to others), epistemic modality as a metarepresentational marker that uses the proposition interpretively, and extended intersubjectivity (encoding the stance of generic or specific third parties)—jointly supports the claim that grammatical form can represent others’ modal evaluations. Because choosing to cite and present a third party’s stance instead of stating one’s own is a strategic move, this layer is closely tied to illocution. Since metarepresentation operates at a level above traditional epistemic modality, it does not conflict with established accounts of ‘-gess-’ and ‘-ci’ (e.g., [types of evidential basis], [already-knownness]), and it can also handle counterexamples. Moreover, this perspective explains why, depending on context, ‘-gess-’ and ‘-ci’ yield nuances such as [mitigation] and [commonsense/obviousness], and why they support illocutionary functions such as [empathy], [complaint], and [promise].