코리아 패싱: 시어도어 루즈벨트 정부의 한국문제 불개입 정책

Abstract

Some people say that today’s international and security situations surrounding the Korean Peninsula are much similar to the situations at the turn of the century from the 19th to the 20th. Many are saying the words like ‘power politics,’ ‘balance of power,’ ‘off-shore balance,’ and even ‘the passing of Korea.’ At the turn of the century from the 19th to the 20th, Korea became a ‘scapegoat’ because of her geo-political location. Despite the Korean-American Treaty of 1882, the Roosevelt Administration never intervened to prohibit Japan from encroaching on Korea. Why? This short paper examines the reasons and the backgrounds of the American non-intervention at the time. Author’s arguments here shall be based largely on the original sources, such as Theodore Roosevelt’s letters. He was a vigorous letter-writer. Therefore, this paper will reconstruct from his words his views, motives, and estimates of the situation at the time. TR asserted that no opportunity for intervention occurred during his presidency. TR even expressed that he was thoroughly pleased with the Japanese victory over Russia, for “Japan is playing our game.” However, Pro-Japanese and anti-Russian inclination itself could not be the real reason why TR encouraged Japan’s annexation of Korea. Rather, TR did it for America’s own interest. TR of course considered the overgrowth of Japanese power would be hazardous not only to the safety of the Philippines, but also to the balance of power in the Far East and to his ‘open door’ policy in Manchuria. This was his concept of the balance of power.