The Causes of the Korean War(1950-1953)
한국전쟁의 기원(1950-1953)
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The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in the two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula as a part of the Asiatic mainland in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe as a spring board to attack Russia, asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategy posture,the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-8) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for the Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause. Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and the Soviet aids for national building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of the full American intervention in the projected war. With the full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from Communist China, Kim Il-sung of North Korea attacked South Korea with the North Korean forces better armed, equipped, prepared than their counterparts of South Korea in the confidence and hope that he could expand his political basis throughout the Korean peninsula. This became the “naked” cause of the Korean War, embracing all other immediate and remote, direct and indirect, definite and circumstantial ones. Because of the swift American and UN intervention in the war, however, the communist side could not secure a quick victory but could recover the status quo ante-bellum only after the Chinese full interference for the fighting. After the fighting for one year, both sides acquiesced in the fact that the Korean problem was too complex to be solved my military means only. The result was an honorable armistice,leaving the ultimate solution on the Korean issue to time and future, producing the two self-claimed victors. The conclusion of the war in this manner, a cease-fire rather than a peace,in fact, set another type and nature of war in the Korean peninsula, a subversive war, employing all kinds of violent and seemingly peaceful ways and means particularly by North Korea. North Korea, that had failed to communize Korea by military means,has engaged in a subversive war against South Korea in order to overthrow the South Korean government and its regime by mobilizing all available destructive and disruptive, deceitful and devious measures and means even in the post-Cold war period. In this regard, the Korean War (1950-3) has not ended in name and fact, and the fundamental cause of the Korean War still lingers on the Korean peninsula.
Abstract
The causes of the Korean War (1950-1953) can be examined in the two categories, ideological and political. Ideologically, the communist side, including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea, desired to secure the Korean peninsula as a part of the Asiatic mainland in a communist bloc. Politically, the Soviet Union considered the Korean peninsula in the light of Poland in Eastern Europe as a spring board to attack Russia, asserted that the Korean government should be “loyal” to the Soviet Union. Because of this policy and strategy posture,the Soviet military government in North Korea (1945-8) rejected any idea of establishing one Korean government under the guidance of the United Nations. The two Korean governments, instead of one, were thus established, one in South Korea under the blessing of the United Nations and the other in the north under the direction of the Soviet Union. Observing this Soviet posture on the Korean peninsula, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung asked for the Soviet support to arm North Korean forces and Stalin fully supported Kim and secured newly-born Communist China’s support for the cause. Judging that it needed a buffer zone against the West and the Soviet aids for national building, the Chinese government readily accepted a role to aid North Korea, specifically, in case of the full American intervention in the projected war. With the full support from the Soviet Union and comradely assistance from Communist China, Kim Il-sung of North Korea attacked South Korea with the North Korean forces better armed, equipped, prepared than their counterparts of South Korea in the confidence and hope that he could expand his political basis throughout the Korean peninsula. This became the “naked” cause of the Korean War, embracing all other immediate and remote, direct and indirect, definite and circumstantial ones. Because of the swift American and UN intervention in the war, however, the communist side could not secure a quick victory but could recover the status quo ante-bellum only after the Chinese full interference for the fighting. After the fighting for one year, both sides acquiesced in the fact that the Korean problem was too complex to be solved my military means only. The result was an honorable armistice,leaving the ultimate solution on the Korean issue to time and future, producing the two self-claimed victors. The conclusion of the war in this manner, a cease-fire rather than a peace,in fact, set another type and nature of war in the Korean peninsula, a subversive war, employing all kinds of violent and seemingly peaceful ways and means particularly by North Korea. North Korea, that had failed to communize Korea by military means,has engaged in a subversive war against South Korea in order to overthrow the South Korean government and its regime by mobilizing all available destructive and disruptive, deceitful and devious measures and means even in the post-Cold war period. In this regard, the Korean War (1950-3) has not ended in name and fact, and the fundamental cause of the Korean War still lingers on the Korean peninsula.
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