주주중심주의의 의의와 한계
The Implications and Limits of Shareholder Primacy Paradigm
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This article is exploring the implications and limits of shareholder primacy paradigm, which has influenced corporate laws and scholarship worldwidely. Historically the paradigm was created as a norm for regulating unfair minority oppression in closely held corporations, but in modern times it has played a role of the leading principles in business, law-making, and corporate law scholarship. But there are fundamental limits for the paradigm to allow managements to set up and implement the sustainable development strategies. Given the limits, the paradigm can not afford to reflect the contemporary mission fully. Comparing to the contractarianism, providing the theoretical grounds for the paradigm, stakeholder theory and communitarianism lack in the practical justification in the current shareholder-centered corporate law system, even though they have the moral legitimacy. So this article suggests the enlightened shareholder paradigm as the third way building a bridge between the contractarianism and stakeholder theory (communi- tarianism).
Abstract
This article is exploring the implications and limits of shareholder primacy paradigm, which has influenced corporate laws and scholarship worldwidely. Historically the paradigm was created as a norm for regulating unfair minority oppression in closely held corporations, but in modern times it has played a role of the leading principles in business, law-making, and corporate law scholarship. But there are fundamental limits for the paradigm to allow managements to set up and implement the sustainable development strategies. Given the limits, the paradigm can not afford to reflect the contemporary mission fully. Comparing to the contractarianism, providing the theoretical grounds for the paradigm, stakeholder theory and communitarianism lack in the practical justification in the current shareholder-centered corporate law system, even though they have the moral legitimacy. So this article suggests the enlightened shareholder paradigm as the third way building a bridge between the contractarianism and stakeholder theory (communi- tarianism).
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