회사기회유용의 법리와 상법 제397조의2
Legal Principle on Usurpation of Corporate Opportunity and Article 397-2 of the Korean Commercial Code
0
조회
0
다운로드
7
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
Article 397-2 of Commercial Code is the legal principle on usurpation of corporate opportunity, which was established by the judicial precedents in United States for 100 years. The article was established under the influence of Article 5.05 in the Principles of Corporate Governance established by American Law Institute (ALI) in 1994. The Article 5.05 of ALI in United States, which our Article 397-2 of Commercial Code followed, was legislated based on multiple judicial precedents on usurpation of corporate opportunity such as the Largarde Case in 1900, the Guth Case in 1939, the Durfee Case in 1948 and the Miller Case in 1974. However, the legislation of Article 397-2 of Commercial Code in Korea was led by civic groups, including People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, to regulate the giving work to affiliated company with favor by conglomerates. Typical examples are the Glovis Case of Hyundai Motor Group and the Gwangju Shinsegye Case. The concept of corporate opportunity is too abstract and its scope can be expanded without limitation; therefore, our Article 397-2 of Commercial Code defined the scope of it in more detail to some extent when following the Article 5.05 of ALI. Nevertheless, still there is a room of dispute on the extent of business scope in corporate opportunity due to the ambiguity of the concept. Duty performance relevance and business relevance are suggested as a standard to judge corporate opportunity; however, still it is not easy to differentiate them clearly. Especially, the scope of corporate opportunity, which may be extensively acknowledged by business relevance, can be controlled by the business judgement of the directors. Another issue is that whether ‘work execution ordering person’ (under Article 401-2-1 of Commercial Code) or controlling shareholder could be held responsible for the duty to prohibit usurpation of corporate opportunity or not. It is difficult to agree on this in reference to the clause and interpretation of Article 397-2 of Commercial Code. Such responsibility can be enforced only when Article 397-2 of Commercial Code on usurpation of corporate opportunity would be added to the main text of Article 401-2-1 of Commercial Code, which regulates work execution ordering person and others. Here, whether the usurpation of corporate opportunity by controlling shareholder and its relatives would be regulated or not is the future task of legislation theory. Another issue is the approval agency on corporate opportunity. The issue is that whether general shareholders’ meeting can approve it by a clause in articles of association or by getting the approval of general shareholders, even current law defines board meeting as the approval agency. The Supreme Court ruled that general shareholders’ meeting can approve ‘self-dealing’ (Article 398 of Commercial Code) by a clause in articles of association or by getting the approval of general shareholders; therefore, it is believed that the usurpation of corporate opportunity should be interpreted in the same manner. Another issue is that whether there should be a clause on intervention right on usurpation of corporate opportunity like the intervention right on prohibition of competitive business or not. It is believed that there would be the effect of intervention right to some extent because there is a clause on compensation for damage in Article 397-2. As discussed above, the legal principle of usurpation of corporate opportunity, which was established by the case law of United States, has been discussed in the bigger framework of the duty of loyalty of directors. As this legal principle has been newly established in Article 397-2 of our Commercial Code, the future rulings of our court on individual cases will draw interest and attention. There was an opposition during the legislation of this clause between the party who supported the clause based on the necessity of conglomerate reformation including prevention of giving work to affiliated company with favor and the party who opposed the clause based on the concern on possible hindrance to economic advance. Anyhow, the legal principle of usurpation of corporate opportunity has been introduced to the reality of our Commercial Code already. More detail studies on how we would interpret usurpation of corporate opportunity prohibition and what would be the application standard of it are future tasks.
Abstract
Article 397-2 of Commercial Code is the legal principle on usurpation of corporate opportunity, which was established by the judicial precedents in United States for 100 years. The article was established under the influence of Article 5.05 in the Principles of Corporate Governance established by American Law Institute (ALI) in 1994. The Article 5.05 of ALI in United States, which our Article 397-2 of Commercial Code followed, was legislated based on multiple judicial precedents on usurpation of corporate opportunity such as the Largarde Case in 1900, the Guth Case in 1939, the Durfee Case in 1948 and the Miller Case in 1974. However, the legislation of Article 397-2 of Commercial Code in Korea was led by civic groups, including People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, to regulate the giving work to affiliated company with favor by conglomerates. Typical examples are the Glovis Case of Hyundai Motor Group and the Gwangju Shinsegye Case. The concept of corporate opportunity is too abstract and its scope can be expanded without limitation; therefore, our Article 397-2 of Commercial Code defined the scope of it in more detail to some extent when following the Article 5.05 of ALI. Nevertheless, still there is a room of dispute on the extent of business scope in corporate opportunity due to the ambiguity of the concept. Duty performance relevance and business relevance are suggested as a standard to judge corporate opportunity; however, still it is not easy to differentiate them clearly. Especially, the scope of corporate opportunity, which may be extensively acknowledged by business relevance, can be controlled by the business judgement of the directors. Another issue is that whether ‘work execution ordering person’ (under Article 401-2-1 of Commercial Code) or controlling shareholder could be held responsible for the duty to prohibit usurpation of corporate opportunity or not. It is difficult to agree on this in reference to the clause and interpretation of Article 397-2 of Commercial Code. Such responsibility can be enforced only when Article 397-2 of Commercial Code on usurpation of corporate opportunity would be added to the main text of Article 401-2-1 of Commercial Code, which regulates work execution ordering person and others. Here, whether the usurpation of corporate opportunity by controlling shareholder and its relatives would be regulated or not is the future task of legislation theory. Another issue is the approval agency on corporate opportunity. The issue is that whether general shareholders’ meeting can approve it by a clause in articles of association or by getting the approval of general shareholders, even current law defines board meeting as the approval agency. The Supreme Court ruled that general shareholders’ meeting can approve ‘self-dealing’ (Article 398 of Commercial Code) by a clause in articles of association or by getting the approval of general shareholders; therefore, it is believed that the usurpation of corporate opportunity should be interpreted in the same manner. Another issue is that whether there should be a clause on intervention right on usurpation of corporate opportunity like the intervention right on prohibition of competitive business or not. It is believed that there would be the effect of intervention right to some extent because there is a clause on compensation for damage in Article 397-2. As discussed above, the legal principle of usurpation of corporate opportunity, which was established by the case law of United States, has been discussed in the bigger framework of the duty of loyalty of directors. As this legal principle has been newly established in Article 397-2 of our Commercial Code, the future rulings of our court on individual cases will draw interest and attention. There was an opposition during the legislation of this clause between the party who supported the clause based on the necessity of conglomerate reformation including prevention of giving work to affiliated company with favor and the party who opposed the clause based on the concern on possible hindrance to economic advance. Anyhow, the legal principle of usurpation of corporate opportunity has been introduced to the reality of our Commercial Code already. More detail studies on how we would interpret usurpation of corporate opportunity prohibition and what would be the application standard of it are future tasks.
참고문헌 (31)
- 김정호, "회사법" (2012), 법문사
- 송옥렬, "상법강의" (2012), 홍문사
- 이철송, "회사법강의(제20판)" (2012), 박영사
- 임재연, "회사법" (2012), 박영사
- 정찬형, "상법강의(상)(제16판)" (2013), 박영사
- 상법일부개정법률안(박영선 의원 대표발의) 검토보고, "국회법제사법위원회", ~ (2009)
- 권순희, "상법 개정안 제398조 제3항(회사기회의 유용금지)에 관한 이론적 검토", 상사법연구, 26(3), pp.27~54 (2007), 한국상사법학회
- 권재열, "회사기회의법리 -2007년 2월 조정된 상법개정안의 비교법적 검토-", 상사법연구, 25(4), pp.71~112 (2007), 한국상사법학회
- 김원기, "회사기회유용금지의 법리 - 미국 법원들의 중요 고려요건과 그 적용가능성 -", 기업법연구, 21(3), pp.83~112 (2007), 한국기업법학회
- 김정호, "회사기회유용금지의 법리", 경영법률, 17(2), pp.129~178 (2007), 한국경영법률학회
- 김정호, "미국 델라웨어주 회사법이 우리 회사법에 미친 영향", 경영법률, 23(1), pp.127~171 (2012), 한국경영법률학회
- 백정웅, "더피사건 -회사성장기회론의 정당성 기준-", 기업법연구, 20(3), pp.235~260 (2006), 한국기업법학회
- 백정웅, "미국의 회사기회유용이론과 우리 상법 ― 델라웨어주의 구스 사건을 중심으로 ―", 상사법연구, 25(3), pp.361~393 (2006), 한국상사법학회
- 백정웅, "회사기회유용이론 -밀러 사건의 2단계 기준을 중심으로-", 상사판례연구, 21(3), pp.91~121 (2008), 한국상사판례학회
- 백정웅, "회사기회유용이론의 적용기준과 항변사유* - 미국법제를 중심으로 -", 비교사법, 16(2), pp.419~466 (2009), 한국비교사법학회
- 유주선, "주식회사에서 회사기회유용에 관한 문제 - 법학방법론적 관점에서 -", 경영법률, 23(1), pp.265~289 (2012), 한국경영법률학회
- 이윤석, "회사기회유용금지에 관한 법적 연구", 박사, 법학, pp.2008
- 이윤석, "회사기회유용의 적용요건과 입법에 대한 검토", 비교사법, 17(2), pp.69~124 (2010), 한국비교사법학회
- 임재연, "회사기회의 유용", 인권과 정의, (363), pp.176~185 (2006), 대한변호사협회
- 전삼현, "회사기회의 유용 및 자기거래 규제에 따른 실무적 현안과 법적 과제", 기업법연구, 25(4), pp.43~68 (2011), 한국기업법학회
- 천경훈, "개정상법상 회사기회유용 금지규정의 해석론 연구", 상사법연구, 30(2), pp.143~213 (2011), 한국상사법학회
- 천경훈, "회사기회의 법리에 관한 연구", 박사, 법학과, pp.2012
- 최수정, "개정상법상 회사기회 유용금지 조항에 관한 소고 - 경제민주화 논의와 관련하여 -", 경영법률, 23(2), pp.103~133 (2013), 한국경영법률학회
- 하삼주, "회사기회이론", 기업법연구, 22(3), pp.109~135 (2008), 한국기업법학회
- 證券取引法硏究會國際部會, "コーポレートㆍガバナンス" (1994), 財團法人 日本證券經濟硏究所
- American Law Institute, "Principles of Corporate Governance : Analysis and Recommendations", ~ (1994)
- William A. Klein, "Business Associations" (2012), Foundation Press
- Eric L. Talley, "Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold : A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine", Yale L. J, 108, pp.277~ (1998)
- Pat K. Chew, "Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine", N. C. L. Rev, 67, pp.435~ (1989)
- Matthew R. Salzwedel, "A Contractual Theory of Corporate Opportunity and a Proposed Statute", Pace L. Rev, 23, pp.83~ (2002)
- Rethinking Delaware's Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, "Stephen M. Bainbridge", UCLA School of Law, ~, pp.Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-17 (2008)
