잠재적 독점기업, 소비자운동, 그리고 후생비용
Potential Monopolies, Consumer Movement, and Welfare Costs
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초록
본 연구는 독점이윤을 얻기 위해 두 기업이 경쟁하는 상황에서 소비자잉여를 보호하려는 소비자 운동이 후생비용에 미치는 영향에 대해 살펴본다. 먼저 기업의 지대추구행위와 소비자단체의 소비자운동이 공존하는 RS-CM 모형과 지대추구행위만 존재하는 RS 모형을 소개한 후, 각 모형 에서 SPNE와 NE를 유도함으로써 각 모형에서의 후생비용을 비교한다. 본 연구에서는 소비자 운동이 오히려 후생비용을 증가시킬 수 있다는 결론이 도출된다. 즉, 상이한 비용함수를 가진 2개의 잠재적 독점기업 간 이윤격차의 크기와 독점이윤에 대비한 소비자잉여 증가분의 크기에 따라, 일정조건하에서는 소비자운동으로 인해 후생비용이 증가한다는 것이다.
Abstract
We analyze how welfare costs are affected by consumer movement (CM), where two rent-seeking (RS), potential monopolies compete for monopoly profit. Two contest models, RS and RS-CM, are employed. The RS model evaluates the welfare costs of RS behavior by the monopolies. The RS-CM model consolidates CM with RS behavior in the analysis of welfare costs. We obtain Nash equilibrium of the RS model and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the RS-CM model, to derive the change in welfare costs due to introduction of consumer movement into the picture. We find that CM may increase welfare costs. That is, depending on the depth of profit divide between the two monopolies and the ratio of CM-induced gain in consumer surplus over monopoly profit, welfare costs rise due to CM in case certain conditions are met.
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